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Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Economies
Executive Briefing
This  paper  summarizes  the  pertinent  literature  on  FDI  in  emerging  economies.  It
focuses  on  the  impact  of  FDI  on  host  economies,  and  on  policy  and  managerial
implications arising from this (potential) impact. This executive briefing summarises
my reading of the literature in form of propositions.
Why do multinational firms invest in emerging economies?
Foreign  direct  investment  in  emerging  economies  is  booming  after  a  temporary
setback in 2001-04. Foreign investors seek local markets and export platforms based
on local resources such as low cost labour or natural resources. Most investors pursue
market-seeking  objectives,  yet  resource-seeking  investors  account  for  many  large
projects,  given  them  a  large  weight  in  many  measures  of  FDI.  Initially,  many
investors may be motivated by only one of the objectives, but most investors over
time develop a range of activities and serve both domestic and export markets.
How does FDI affect host economies?
The impact of FDI on host economies is complex as foreign investors interact with,
and  thus  influence,  many  local  individuals,  firms  and  institutions.  However,  on
average the effect may well be close to nil.
Local firms benefit potentially in many ways: learning from example, labour
mobility, export market access, improved supply bases, or direct relations as suppliers
or customers. However, these effects vary with the characteristics of the FDI project,
in  particular  it’s  development  of  local  supply  networks,  it’s  investment  in  human
capital, employee mobility, and the value added in local operations.
The impact of FDI varies moreover with the ability of local stakeholders to
take advantage of the potential benefits of FDI.  In particular, the local regulatory
framework  has  to  provide  for  competitive  conditions  that  are  conducive  to  local
entrepreneurship, while avoiding undue market power of the foreign investment firm.
Moreover, local individuals and firms need to have the ability to learn from foreign
partners – discussed in the literature as ‘absorptive capacity’.3
What can governments do (better)?
MNEs undertake FDI if and when it suits their global strategy, and they will invest in
the type of project they need to achieve their strategic objectives. Government policy
towards inward or outward FDI has a negligible effect on these corporate strategies.
Government policy may thus focus on attracting firms that plan to locate attractive
projects, rather than try to convince them to change what they are doing.
Specific  incentive  schemes  designed  to  attract  FDI,  such  as  tax  breaks  or
subsidies,  may  affect  location  decisions  at  the  margin,  especially  between
neighbouring regions, and especially for footloose projects that do not require specific
linkages to the local economy. Yet these are also the least attractive projects in terms
of expected local benefits. Moreover, the competition between regions for specific
FDI projects entails the danger of a “winner’s curse” as the investor may be able to
internalize most of the social benefits.
A conducive business climate may be more important for both MNEs seeking
investment locations, and for local firms and entrepreneurs seeking to benefit from the
presence of MNEs.
What can MNEs do (better)?
Societies at large, especially outside Anglo-American countries, increasingly expect
MNEs to assume social responsibilities that go beyond maximizing shareholder value.
This view is supported by a recent UN resolution.
This responsibility may extend beyond the boundaries of the firm, for instance
to  workers  employed  by  subcontractors  in  distant  locations,  to  emissions  into  the
natural environment, and to corrupt business practices by business associates.
In raising ‘corporate social responsibility’ defining standards is the easy part.
The main challenges concern the implementation and monitoring of these standards
both within the firm and among its business partners.4
Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Economies
1. Introduction: Why do multinational firms invest in emerging economies?
Foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  is  a  major  source  of  capital  and  technology  in
emerging economies, and continues to accelerate in economic significance. FDI flows
have recovered from a downturn in recent years and with US$ 233 billion in 2004
almost reached the 2001 peak of US$ 253 billion (in developing countries, excluding
Eastern Europe). This recovery stands in contrast to FDI in developed economies,
which fell to US$ 390 billion in 2004, about a third of the 2000 level, mainly due to
fewer  large  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  Europe.  However,  FDI  in  emerging
economies  very  unequally  distributed  with  China  accounting  for  US$  61  billion,
followed  by  Hong  Kong  (34),  Brazil  (18),  Mexico  (16)  and  Singapore  (16).
Substantial amounts are also received by several other countries in East/South-East
Asia and in Latin America. Yet others receive little. India increased its FDI inflows to
the highest level ever, yet US$ 5 billion is little for the second largest population of
the work. Similarly scarce is FDI in Africa. The entire continent attracted US$ 18
billion, which are distributed very unequally (all data: UN 2005).
In view of these numbers, it is not surprising that the role of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) in emerging economies has become a key aspect of contemporary
disputes over the merits of globalization (Moran, 2002; Bhagwati, 2004). Adversaries
of  globalization  see  MNEs  as  the  culprits  of  many  of  the  failures  of  the  global
economy,  from  persistent  inequality,  to  sweatshop  working  conditions  and  to
environmental degradation. Proponents of MNEs, on the other hand, point to many
benefits that global economic exchange and foreign investment may bring, from lower5
prices to consumers, to knowledge transfer to emerging economies, and the spread of
modern values and management practices.
Before examining these claims, I briefly introduce MNEs, their motives, and
the types of projects they may undertake in emerging economies. Broadly, foreign
investors in emerging economies pursue one or both of two objectives,
 access to local markets through local production and/or sale of imported products
 export-oriented production on the basis of local resources such as low cost labour,
natural resources, or (less common) human capital.
Globalisation  has  led  to  the  opening  of  many  markets  and  thus  increased
competition  not  only  in  emerging  markets,  but  also  in  developed  countries.  In
consequence, rather than building a strong position in several markets in their home
country, more and more companies pursue a global strategy that is focused on one
particular  industry.  In  recent  years,  many  MNEs  have  gone  through  a  process  of
‘globalfocusing’, as they have shed peripheral product lines and expanded their core
businesses, often by acquisition (Meyer 2006). As industry-specialists, they aim for
global leadership positions in their chosen segment.
FDI in emerging economies can serve this objective by extending the market
reach or by providing a global supply base. For companies aiming to become global
leaders in their market segment, competitive interaction with global rivals may induce
early entry in emerging economies in view of first-mover or fast-second advantages.
Global  competitive  pressures  may  also  induce  MNE  to  find  new  ways  to  reduce
production  costs.  These  pressures  lead  to  outsourcing  to  low  cost  suppliers  and6
investing to exploit location specific assets, for example, natural resources (see also
the companion paper by Mari Sako).
Our surveys in India, Vietnam, Egypt and South Africa (Estrin and Meyer,
2004)  and  in  Hungary,  Poland  and  Lithuania  (Meyer  et  al.,  2004)  illustrate  some
interesting patterns of FDI:
 About three quarters of FDI aims at supplying the domestic market in the host
country - except in Vietnam where the proportion is around 50:50.
 Export-oriented investors account for many large projects, giving them a large
weight in many measures of FDI. Initially, investors appear to be motivated by
one of the objectives, but most investors over time develop a range of activities
focused on both domestic and export markets.
 Most  FDI  projects  are  small;  at  the  time  of  formation  the  median  number  of
employees was 40 in Egypt, 30 in India, 76 in South Africa and 85 in Vietnam,
although some have subsequently grown significantly.
 Mergers and acquisitions between MNE on a global or local stage affect their
emerging market operations. Some MNEs divest selected operations as part of a
global restructuring, while others may acquire such affiliates.
 A large and increasing share of FDI is in service sectors and construction, notably
in telecommunications and financial services.
 Many  investors  originate  within  the  same  region;  and  regional  trade  and
integration  policies,  as  well  as  global  ones,  often  influence  location  decisions.
Thus  FDI  generates  regional  rather  than  global  exports,  especially  in  Eastern
Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East.7
Policymakers may therefore want to think carefully about how to develop their
FDI strategies in the context of regional trade policies. Moreover, expected benefits in
telecommunications or banking compared would be different than those in the more
frequently analyzed manufacturing sectors.
2. How does FDI affect host economies?
The impact of FDI on host economies is complex as foreign investors interact with,
and  thus  influence,  many  local  individuals,  firms  and  institutions.  However,  on
average, the net effect may well be close to nil. Figure 1 outlines various channels of
impact that I will discuss in this section. The foreign invested firm, or FDI project, is
closely interacting with local businesses; most of the impact on the host economy is
transmitted trough this interaction. Beyond this, FDI also impacts on other aspects,
including macroeconomic variables, the host economy’s institutional framework as
ass as the natural and social environment.
Most of these interactions are bilateral. On the one hand, foreign investors
adapt  to  the  local  institutional,  social  and  natural  environment  in  designing  their
strategies.  On  the  other  hand,  they  would –  intentionally  or  not –  influence  the
environment through for instance political lobbying, setting good examples of labour
standards, or polluting the environment. The FDI project in turn is designed by an
MNE located outside the country. The structure and strategies of this MNE thus shape
the project and its interactions with the local environment.
Figure 1: Channels of Impact of FDI8
Source: Meyer (2004)
On a macroeconomic level, FDI influences key variables of concern to policy
makers:  balance  of  payment,  employment,  gross  domestic  investment,  and
international trade. FDI is commonly believed to have a positive effect on each of
these  variables,  yet  theoretical  considerations  suggest  also  countervailing  effects.
However,  these  effects  are  often  indirect  and  thus  heard  to  measure  empirically
(Dunning  1993,  chap  14).  In  consequence  the net  effect  of  FDI  on  key
macroeconomic variables is often hard to establish empirically:
 FDI  imports  capital,  but  at  a  later  stage  capital  is  repatriated  through  profit
remittance or project discontinuation – and in this way, the host country pays for
the costs of capital. However, FDI capital is appreciated by hosts because it tends
to be less volatile then other forms of capital inflow (UN 1999, chap 6).
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 FDI  creates  employment,  especially  if  it  is  invested  in  Greenfield  operations.
Moreover, additional jobs may be created in local suppliers. Yet FDI may also
crowd out local firms that use more labour-intensive methods of production and
thus more employment. The policy-relevant net-employment effect is thus hard to
assert (Dunning 1993, chap 13, UN 1999, chap 9). In the case of acquisitions, the
employment effect is even harder to assert because it requires an analysis of what
would have happened to the local firm if it had not been taken over by the foreign
investor (Estrin and Meyer 2004).
 FDI  increases  gross  domestic  investment,  yet  part  of  it  may  be  domestically
funded or the capital inflow may increase the exchange rate and thus costs of
international borrowing; both effects can lead to crowding out of local investment.
 FDI generates exports. Yet FDI also generates imports, especially in the case of
market-seeking  FDI  and  in  the  case  of  outsourcing  operations  that  process
imported components. MNE are typically more internationally oriented, but this
affects both sales and procurement. Thus, the net effect of the trade balance may
be much smaller than data on exports by FDI may suggest (UN 1999, chap 8).
Dunning concluded in 1993 (p. 413) that “ the question .. is not whether MNE
activity is trade promoting or trade replacing, but whether it is an efficient instrument
for the reorganization of the cross-border allocation of economic activity in a way
that  is  conducive to  both  national  and  international  economic  welfare”.  This
conclusion holds even more true in 2005 as transactions have grown in complexity.
Moreover, I would like to extend it to other macroeconomic policy targets, namely
capital import, employment and gross domestic investment.10
Overall, the effect on macroeconomic variables varies greatly with the specific
features of an FDI project, such that evidence on macroeconomic relationships may
not be transferable from one context to another, and thus provides little guidance for
policy makers. Rather, we need to understand the microeconomic effects of FDI to
identify which FDI and under what circumstances benefits the host economy.
2.1. Horizontal and vertical spillover effects to local firms
Many  countries  aim  to  attract  inward  FDI  to  accelerate  the  development  of
technological capabilities, and MNE are often considered a suitable transfer vehicle.
Through interaction with local firms, MNEs may generate spillovers that enhance the
productivity of local firms. The literature points to different channels (Blomstrom and
Kokko, 2002, Meyer, 2004):
 Demonstration effects work through the direct contact between local agents
and  MNEs  operating  at  different  levels  of  technology.  After  observing  an
innovation adapted to local conditions, local entrepreneurs may recognize their
feasibility,  and  thus  strive  to  imitate  them.  As  local  businesses  observe
existing users, information about new technologies and business practices is
diffused, uncertainty is reduced, and imitation increases.
 FDI contributes to human capital formation, especially through training and
labour mobility. Trained local employees may move to locally owned firms
or set-up own entrepreneurial businesses. MNEs typically pay salaries above
local standards to discourage highly trained employees from leaving, yet they
may not oppose such movements if the new firms become business partners.
Many  successful  local  firms  trace  their  origins  to  entrepreneurs  or  top
managers that had prior links to MNEs (Altenburg, 2000). Even where few11
employees  move,  those  that  move  may  make  a  substantive  contribution  to
local business.
 FDI may help local firms to access export markets. MNEs are more likely to
share general trade knowledge, as it is less industry-specific and not part of
their core capabilities and its diffusion to local businesses does not endanger
their  own  competitive  advantage.  Moreover,  foreign  investors  may  help
building trade channels and a country of origin reputation that local followers
may use for their exports (Altenburg, 2000).
 Foreign  investors  may  support  local  supplier  industries  and markets  for
specialized  inputs,  such  as  labour  and  materials.  Beyond  the  quality  of
physical  products  this  may  enhance  in  particular  the  quality  of  services
provided by suppliers, such as just-in-time delivery and low default rates. With
these improved inputs, local firms in turn may enhance their productivity.
 Local firms may benefit from vertical linkages in a supply chain, benefiting
from  knowledge  transfers  to  suppliers  and  customers.  MNEs  may  make  a
deliberate  effort  to  improve  the  quality  of  local  suppliers,  especially  for
components that cannot be cost-efficiently imported due to high transportation
costs or where the local industry has a natural cost advantage (e.g. for labour
intensive components). These effects benefit also firms in other industries, for
instance providers of business services, such as accounting or legal services.
Similar, they may support their customers, for instance by providing training
in sales and marketing.
However, negative spillovers on local firms are also possible, notably through
crowding out effects. Foreign investors may gain market share at the expense of local12
firms.  This  would  leave  the  local  firms,  at  least  in  the  short  run,  with  excess
production  capacity  and  thus  low  productivity  and  low  profitability.  Moreover,
foreign investment may source internationally and thus weaken the local industry’s
domestic supplier base.
Empirical research has focused on horizontal spillovers, i.e. benefits attracted
by local firm in the same industry. We have recently conducted a Meta-analysis of
this literature (Sinani and Meyer, 2005) that is a study that aggregates the findings of
several studies using special empirical techniques. We found that on average these
studies do not find statistically significant spillovers benefiting local firms.
These studies regress FDI presence in the same industry on the productivity of
local firms. To infer a statistically significant positive impact, a study would have to
find a positive t-statistic of at least 1,96 (5% significance level) of the coefficient of
FDI-presence. However, some studies find negative effects. Figure 2 summarizes the
findings  of  the  Meta  analysis.  We  estimate  the  t-statistic  as  a  function  of
characteristics of the study, and report predicted values for the t-statistic (Figure 2).
On average, we find that on average the effect is negative for industrialized countries,
and positive but small for developing and transition economies. Changes in the study
design  have  only  small  effects  on  the  predicted  outcome.  The  significant  positive
effects found in many early studies (and thus policy advice) can be attributed to the
use  of  cross  sectional  (CS)  data,  a  technique  that  has  now  been  shown  to  create
upward biases. Thus, the argument of horizontal spillovers does not justify policy
intervention.13
Figure 2: Meta-analysis of horizontal spillovers:
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Base Case: Developed Country, 1995 data, firm level panel data, N=3425 (=median value for
studies that are firm-level panel data).
Interpretation: Predicted values are for a bases case, and variations of explanatory variables
over  the  base  case.  Note  that  for  industry  level  studies,  the  median  number  of
observations in these studies (n=145) was used.
Source: Sinani and Meyer (2005).
On the other hand,  empirical research on vertical spillovers provides more
favourable evidence of the existence of spillovers, albeit such research is difficult to
conduct  (it  requires  detailed  industry-level  input-output  data).  A  positive  effect  is
plausible  as  MNE  may  have  an  interest  to  help  their  local  business  partners  to
improve their business practices, yet they would not have an interest in helping their
(potential)  competitors.  Yet,  it  is  less  clear  who  accrues  the  benefits  of  improved
productivity especially in case of unequal bargaining power.14
2.2. Variation of impact across MNE
MNEs vary in their internal operations, including for instance the centralization of
decision-making, organizational cultures, and human resource management practices.
Consequently, subsidiaries in emerging economies would vary in their interactions
with other business units of the parent’s network. This in turn affects interactions with
local businesses, for instance, the development of local supply networks, investment
in human capital, employee mobility, and the stages of the value chain located in the
host economy.
Some of these variations are due to industry-specific features (Grosse 2005).
Infrastructure FDI for instance in transport or telecommunication can greatly enhance
productivity  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy,  yet  at  the  risk  of  foreign  control –
possibly even monopoly – if the sector is not appropriately regulated. Similar benefits
and  risk  arise  from  financial  sector  investment.  Services  such  as  information
technology operate in more competitive markets and may benefit a wide range of
other business. In manufacturing, major variations arise from the need or opportunity
to  produce  close  to  the  market  due  to  high  transportation  costs  or  low  scale
economies.
An aspect of particular relevance for MNE spillovers is intra-firm knowledge
transfer. Knowledge  sharing  within  the  MNE  is  a  precondition  for  knowledge
spillovers.  Typically  investors  would  transfer  ‘know  how’  to  their  affiliates  to
enhance efficiency and productivity. Yet they would keep tighter control over their
‘know why’, because such knowledge could – if diffused to other firms – threaten the
international market position of the firm. Knowledge spillovers would also rise with
higher  value  added  activities,  such  as  complex  manufacturing  processes,  such  as
customized machinery, rather than mass assembly of for example garments or shoes.15
In  particular, research  and  development (R&D)  is  commonly  believed  to
generate  positive  spillovers.  Traditionally,  MNE  would  keep  their  R&D  activities
close to their home base, or locate it in leading edge clusters such as Silicon Valley.
However  recent  data  show  that  R&D  is  increasingly  located  in  countries  such  as
China, India, Singapore and Brazil (UN 2005). This potentially boosts the technology
flows between MNEs and local suppliers or local institutions, such as universities.
Another  source  of  variation  is  the  mode  of  entry.  In  a joint  venture,  two
partners share their resources in return for access to the partner’s resources. This can
lead to mutual learning, and thus extend linkages and knowledge spillovers in the
local  business  community.  Yet MNEs  would  be  more  concerned  about  unwanted
technology diffusion and thus be more reluctant to share crucial knowledge with local
employees. Greenfield projects create new businesses and thus have direct positive
effects on employment and domestic value added, and increase competitive pressures
on local competitors. Acquisitions, on the other hand, are at the time of entry fully
operating enterprises. The new owners may or may not continue traditional business
relationships,  possibly  drawing  on  their  existing  suppliers,  which  would  strongly
impact on local industries. However, based on inherited operations, acquisitions are
more likely then Greenfield projects to engage in R&D.
These variations influence the effectiveness of government designing policies
aimed to attract FDI. Policies ought to consider explicitly what type of FDI would
benefit  the  host  economy,  rather  than  focusing  on  quantitative  targets  for  FDI.
Moreover, evaluation of policies should analyze what types of investors, and with
what  type  of projects  would  consider  the  local  environment  (incl.  political
institutions) attractive.16
2.3. Variation of Impact across local contexts
The  impact  of  FDI  varies  moreover  with  the  ability  of  local  stakeholders  to  take
advantage  of  the  potential  benefits  of  FDI.  Benefits  are  not  obtained  quasi-
automatically.  Firms’  own  strategies  and  resource  endowment  are  crucial  for
benefiting from interaction with foreign investors. In particular, the local regulatory
framework  has  to  provide  for  competitive  conditions  that  are  conducive  to  local
entrepreneurship, while avoiding undue market power of the foreign investment firm.
Business  scholars  have  focused  on  absorptive  capacity  in  the  contexts  of
knowledge transfers within MNEs and within strategic alliances. Zahra and George
(2002:  186)  define  absorptive  capacity  as  “a  set  of  organizational  routines  and
processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge to
produce a dynamic organizational capability”. It encompasses not only human capital
but also structural characteristics of the organization that affect its ability to value,
assimilate and commercialize new knowledge. This in turn has been associated with
structural features of the organization, such as strategic and organizational flexibility.
For  example,  local  joint  venture  partners  may  improve  their  capacity  to  learn  by
promoting organizational flexibility, and encouraging collaboration and exchange of
information within the organization, and giving employees greater latitude to alter
activity patterns (Lane et al. 2001).
FDI also can act as a stimulus to innovation and discovery. Entrepreneurial
activity  by  individuals  leaving  a  foreign-owned  affiliate  to  establish  their  own
business generates potentially large spillovers. Studies of successful local firms find
that many entrepreneurs or top managers had prior links to MNEs. Moreover, large
MNEs may stimulate the evolution of industrial clusters. FDI by a lead firm may draw
other network members to the same location, and thus create a larger impact than the17
initial investment alone. For small ambitious firms in emerging economies, access to
such production networks is of increasing importance.
Government policy thus ought to aim to enable local firms to interact with
multinational corporations in ways that benefits both partners. The main consequence
of this is that most policies that promote the development of local businesses would
also  strengthen  the  abilities  of  local  businesses  to  make  the  best  out  of  their
interaction with foreign investors, for instance education policy or competition policy.
2.4. Impact on local stakeholders: labour and the environment
Globalization debates take a special interest in the standards in MNE affiliates and
their  subcontractors  in  emerging  economies.  Some  observers  fear  that  the  strong
bargaining  power  of  MNEs  vis-à-vis  their  employees  and  potential  host  countries
leads to a lowering of labour standards and wages, and may have a detrimental impact
on the natural environment. Does competition for FDI trigger a ”race to the bottom”
(Spar and Yoffie, 1999), i.e. a lowering of standards for labour and the environment?
The literatures on labour and environmental issues are largely separate, but the lines
of argument are similar, such that we can discuss them here together.
On  the  one  hand,  concerns  about  global  standardization  and  the  firm’s
reputation induce many MNE affiliates to pay higher wages and to establish higher
labour standards than local firms with respect to e.g. working hours, sick leave, child
labour,  or  unionization  compared  (Moran,  2002).  Since  MNEs  generally  wish  to
retain their qualified staff, they want to keep them satisfied, unless they are employing
unskilled labour with few outside job opportunities. Similarly, the standardization of
business practices and technologies across the subsidiaries of an MNE would raise
standards above local requirements in countries with less demanding standards. On18
the  other  hand,  lower  standards  and  lower  wages  present  opportunities  to  reduce
production costs.
1
The unease about the ”race to the bottom” is of concern in certain industries,
such as textiles, footwear and assembly of electronics. Spar and Yoffie (1999:565)
argue that a race to the bottom can occur in industries where
 Firms and goods are mobile across borders, i.e. free trade and investment, and
 ”Regulation and  factor  costs are heterogeneous – and the heterogeneity  leaves
gaps that can be turned into the firm’s competitive advantage”.
Moreover lowering of standards is facilitated by
 Homogeneity of products (or of components at certain stages of the value chain),
such that price is a key competitive parameter.
 Regulatory differentials are important for the cost structure of the industry, such as
labour law for textiles and footwear.
 MNEs would not incur major transaction costs or sunk costs when relocating a
production plant, i.e. location is not sticky.
Businesses  are  generally  not  interested  in  engaging  in  such  a  race  to  the
bottom, but they are pushed into it by competitive pressures. Theoretically, if firms
were to cooperate and implement common standards, the race would stop. However,
1 Economists may argue that as long as the contract is entered voluntary, both partners would be better
off.  Notably,  local  wages  reflect  outside  earning  opportunities,  which  are  typically  low  in  those
countries where so-called sweatshops are located. However, this assumes ex ante full information and
the absence of switching costs. Both conditions are unlikely to be fulfilled in labor markets, especially
for migrant workers in developing countries. Moreover, bargaining power and even the ability to price
discriminate may allow locally important employers to accrue most of the surplus created.19
this would require cartel-like cooperation which would be hard to enforce, especially
if firms are heterogeneous. But contrary to market cartels, policy makers may support
the creation of standards cartels (Spar and Yoffie, 1999).
Industry  self-regulation  can  achieve  part  of  such  regulation  by  creating
common standards and certification. Many initiatives by firms, industry associations
and  governments  aim  to  raise  standards  and  to  reverse  the  ‘race  to  the  bottom’.
However, there no clear empirical evidence whether these initiatives would achieve
their objectives: are industries with the aforementioned characteristics actually “racing
to the bottom”? How effective is industry self-regulation? Are standards cartels, with
or without government involvement, moderating races to the bottom?
This involvement of NGOs raises many empirical questions. They have not
yet been comprehensively evaluated in terms of for instance stakeholder involvement,
rigor of the standards, accountability of the monitoring and complementarities with
state regulation. It is not clear how NGO involvement and codes of conduct would
influence  business  standards:  Is  the  system  falling short  because  monitors  can’t
observe all abuses, or is it overshooting as NGOs proclaim higher standards then a
social consensus would approve?
Policy  makers  should  moreover  focus  on  long-term  implications.  Poor
working conditions, including child labour, have been common during early stages of
industrialization  in  Europe  and  North  America.  Moreover,  Asian  economies  that
permitted  sweatshops,  like  Taiwan  and  South  Korea,  have  substantially  improved
their  standards  of  living  over  the  past  three  decades,  while  countries  that  resisted
“exploitation”, like India, continue to suffer for widespread poverty.  However, these
specific cases do not allow inferring that sweatshops would be a necessary step in the
process of economic development.20
3. What can governments do (better)?
Governments and MNEs live in a complex relationship as they pursue common goals;
yet also experience some distinct conflicts of interest. Grosse (2005:4) outlines the
ambiguous demands of policy makers towards MNEs. They want:
 “To  achieve  economic  growth,  but  they  are  not  as  positive  about  foreign
(firms’) ownership of parts of the local economy”
 “Development  of  technology  and  skills,  but  not  necessarily  dependence  on
foreign provision of these key underpinnings of competitiveness.”
 “Economic development, but without environmental damage or social conflict
that foreign (and local) firms might cause”
 “The opportunity for local citizens to enjoy products and services from around
the world, but still to maintain a national or local culture and values”
 “Their sovereignty to pursue national interests, when the increasingly global
economy often forces supra-national goals on them”.
These  double-edged  objectives,  together  with  the  diversity  of  interactions  across
foreign  investors,  suggest  to  fine-tune  government  policy  such  as  to  optimize  the
received benefits. This however raises two questions. Firstly, how could such a policy
be designed? And, is it feasible to implement such a policy in practice?
3.1. Policy Objectives
In general, policy interventions may be justified if a) they increase (static) efficiency
of resource allocation in inefficient markets, b) change the distribution of income and21
wealth  in  a  politically  desirable  way,  or  c)  enhance  the  dynamic  and  long-term
processes of accumulation of resources and capabilities in the national economy.
The efficiency  argument  is  rarely  used  as  a  pro-FDI  argument  unless  the
policies aim to rebalance distortions created by other policy interventions, such as
import quotas or tax regimes. The distribution argument is naturally subject to widely
varying value judgement. However, even if one believes in the merits of redistribution
from  MNEs  (and  thus  their  shareholders)  to  local  citizens,  it  is  doubtful  if  such
policies can be effective vis-à-vis globally mobile MNEs.
The dynamic  capabilities  argument  implicitly  underlies  most  contemporary
argumentation for positive intervention for FDI. The creation of industrial clusters
requires  many  economic  agents  to  co-specialize  their  investment  decisions,  from
students choosing subjects at universities to businesses investing in R&D. However,
individuals  and  even  firms  are  inefficient  in  coordinating  their  (interdependent)
investment  decisions  concerning  the  development  of  new  capabilities  that  often
transcend  the  boundaries  of  specific  firms.  Thus,  policy  intervention  aims  to
overcome a dynamic coordination failure and attract specific FDI projects that may
stimulate cluster development (Lall 1996). Government intervention aiming to create
internationally  competitive  clusters  of  firms  would  however  have  to  have  rare
foresight into the future competitiveness of industrial sectors and technologies.
From  the  perspective  of  potential  foreign  investors,  the  general  business
environment  may  be  more  important  than specific  incentives.  The  business
environment includes some aspects that can be influenced by government policy such
as  the  bureaucracy  handling  approval  or  registration  of  new  businesses,  or  the
efficiency of regulatory institutions (World Bank 2005). Thus, the first prerogative for
policy makers to create an infrastructure, such that investing firms can, with limited22
risk, take up the opportunities offered by the comparative advantage of potential host
economies,  for  example  relatively  cheap  labour  or  raw  materials.  A  conducive
business climate may attract both MNEs seeking investment locations, and local firms
and entrepreneurs seeking to benefit from the presence of MNEs.
A generally conducive business environment can be expected to foster both
the efficiency of resource allocation, and the dynamic development of capabilities –
and arguably also creates benefits for weaker income groups. The question however
remains if and how specific policies might create additional benefits.
3.2. Policy Implementation
Even if policy interventions can theoretically be expected to enhance the benefits of
foreign direct investment, policy advice first has to analyze whether the policies can
actually be implemented. In particular, can the desired positive effects be generated
without  creating  undesirable  side  effects  of  activist  government  policy,  such  as
bureaucracy, corruption, and favourism for politically influential groups? The answer
often depends on the general state of political institutions in the country, in particular
their efficiency and their independence from interest groups. Interventionalist policies
that helped Japan or Singapore may not work elsewhere because they depend on the
existent of an efficient and highly respected public sector.
Moreover,  policy makers  should  not  overestimate  their  impact  on  MNEs.
Firms undertake FDI if and when it suits their global strategy, and they invest in the
type of project they need to achieve their strategic objectives. Government policy
towards inward or outward FDI generally has negligible effects on these corporate
strategies. Government policy may thus focus on attracting firms that plan to locate
attractive projects, rather than try to convince them to do change what they are doing.23
Incentives schemes for FDI, such as tax breaks or subsidies, may influence
location  decisions at  the  margin,  especially  between  neighbouring  regions,  and
especially  for  footloose  projects  that  do  not  require  specific  linkages  to  the  local
economy (and thus may create fewer spillovers). However, the competition between
regions  for  specific  FDI  projects  entails  the  danger  of  a  “winner’s  curse”  as  the
investor  may  able  to  internalize  most  of  the  social  benefits.  On  the  one  hand,
competition among potential hosts for FDI is good because FDI reacts primarily to
’fundamentals’  such  as  political  &  economic  stability,  market  access  &  growth,
skilled workforce and infrastructure. Investment in ’fundamentals’ is good for both
domestic and foreign firms, such that even if no FDI materializes, this may benefit the
host economy. On the other hand, competition among potential hosts may be bad
because governments face a ”prisoner’s dilemma”. They have a collective interest to
refrain from bidding wars, but have individual incentives to offer potential investors
some fiscal or financial inducements. Hence, the aggregate level of inducements may
be too high (Oman 2000).
Thus,  policy  makers  proposing  a  specific  policy  to  attract  FDI  should  ask
themselves two questions: Do we have appropriate public sector institutions in place
to implement the policy? And, do the direct and indirect costs of the policy for society
stand in an appropriate relation to the expected benefits? These issues may be of less
concern  to  policies  improving  the  general  business  climate  than  for  policies  that
specifically aim to attract a specific investor.
3.3. Policy as Bargaining
Economic analysis often presumes policy issues to be a matter of governments setting
the rules, and investors adjusting. In practice, however, the relationship is much more24
complex as governments and businesses engage in various form of direct and indirect
bargaining. Traditionally,  business-government  relationships  were  often  seen  as
adversary,  especially  in  developing  countries.  However  the  recent  literature  has
outlined that this relationship can and should be collaborative. The relative bargaining
positions and the potential for a collaborative relationship however greatly vary with
the specific nature of the project (Grosse 2005).
Governments aiming to attract foreign investors by selling a strong local firm,
such as an incumbent telecom operator, have a valuable asset and thus often a strong
bargaining position. It is weaker if they seek a partner for a loss-making firm in a
declining industry such as steel. To attract Greenfield investors, countries offering
distinct  location  advantages  such  as  an  industrial  cluster  or  human  capital  have
stronger negotiation positions then those offering only financial incentives. On the
other hand, foreign investors pursuing Greenfield entry have more degrees of freedom
with respect to their intra-country location choices. This gives them high bargaining
power vis-à-vis local municipalities, and the opportunity to take advantage of special
incentives in SEZs and industrial parks.
The relative bargaining position however changes over time, which has long
been a major concern to business scholars analyzing government-MNE relationships.
After foreign investors have ‘sunk’ their capital investment, governments may change
the policy  framework  a  little  but  not  as  much  as  to  trigger  divestment.  This
‘obsolescing bargain’ thus weakens the position of MNEs over time. It may be of
declining concern as many policy variables are agreed in multilateral agreements such
as the rules of the WTO, and governments are concerned about their reputation in the
wider investor communities. However, for certain types of capital intensive projects in25
sectors that are highly sensitive to regulation – such as telecommunication or energy –
the concerns about obsolescing bargain still exist (Grosse 2005).
4. What can MNEs do (better)?
4.1. Moral viewpoints
The question how FDI contributes to host economies can hardly be separated from
ethical questions concerning how MNEs should treat their local environment and their
local stakeholders. Societies at large, especially outside Anglo-American countries,
increasingly  expect  MNEs  to  assume  social  responsibilities  that  go  beyond
maximizing shareholder value. This view is supported by a 2003 UN resolution:
“Recognizing that even though states have the primary responsibility to promote, secure
the  fulfilment  of,  respect,  ensure  respect  of,  and  protect  human  rights,  transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of society, are also responsible
for promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights…” (United National Social and Economic Council, 2003: 1).
Authors on these issues can be broadly distinguished between those taking a
normative view and those taking an instrumental view. The normative view believes
that  MNEs  have  a  moral  responsibility  to  their  stakeholders,  and  thus  reject  the
primacy  of  shareholders  over  other  stakeholders.  Thus,  managers’ primary  moral
obligation may be to their shareholders. Yet they also have other obligations, such as
respect for the law and respect for core moral norms. Managers thus would have to
balance their obligations to the shareholders with equally legitimate obligations to26
other stakeholders (e.g., Hartman et al. 2003). This view is also implicit in the above-
cited UN declaration.
On  some  issues,  such  as  child  labour  or  slavery,  a  broad  international
consensus supports certain moral standards, known as ‘hyper norms’. Yet on other
issues  such  as  CO2  pollution  or  employees’  right  to  annual  leave,  standards  vary
greatly  between  and  within  countries.  Certain  ethical  principles  are  considered
appropriate  for  some  but  not  all  cultures,  which  creates  a  ‘moral  free  space’
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). In global but organizationally disaggregated supply
chains, the responsibility of consumers and upstream distributors for their product
chain has increasingly captured the minds of the interested public. MNEs are under
pressure to increase the labour, health and environmental standards in their operations
abroad.  However,  no  clear  guidance  exists  for  well-meaning  managers  what
constitutes  good  labour  practice  and  how  it  should  be  implemented.  In  particular,
there is no consensus how far moral responsibility would extend beyond the (legal)
boundaries of the firm, for instance to workers employed by subcontractors in distant
locations, to emissions into the natural environment, and to corrupt business practices
by business associates.
Proponents of the instrumental view argue, somewhat simplified, that firms
should  pursue  high labour  or  environmental  standards if  this  benefits  their  own
profitability. Such positive effect may arise in different ways:
 Raising  standards  may  raise  productivity  if  environmental  standards  reduce
wastage, or labour standards increase work motivation. Empirical evidence shows
that  such  benefits  can  be  substantial.  For  example, Frenkel  and  Scott  (2002)
compare two similar subcontractors of sports-shoe manufacturer Adidas in China27
and found that the firm that took a collaborative approach to introducing a new
corporate code of conduct achieved better performance in terms of for example
reject rates or employee turnover.
 Firms adapting ambitious corporate social responsibility charters aim to build a
reputation  of  an  ethical  firm.  This  should  increase  the  perceived  value  of  the
products by consumers and by investors. If markets are efficient, and consumers
would be willing to pay higher prices for goods produced with higher standards,
then  meeting  these  standards  would  benefit  profitability.  However,  is  this
mechanism sufficiently efficient to translate consumer preferences into business
practices  in  distant  locations? While  consumer  surveys  often  suggest  that
consumer value ‘ethical’ qualities of the products they buy, it is less clear to what
extend this actually increases their willingness. Experimental evidence suggests
that consumers would pay a premium for certain features (Auger et al., 2003).
 Higher  standards  may  shield  MNEs  against  negative  publicity. Traditionally,
many MNEs took the legalistic view that they cannot be held responsible for the
labour practices of their foreign suppliers. However, the activism of NGOs and
attention  of  the  media  put  spotlights  on  incidences  of  practices  considered
unethical by these stakeholders, such that “the advantages of lower cost labour or
lower cost inputs from more abusive suppliers must be weighted against the crush
of negative publicity, the costs of public relations, and the possibility of consumer
protests.” (Spar 1998).  Such systems  are expected to link ethical behaviour to
profitability: failure to comply to standards that a firm committed to may severely
affect the firm’s reputation, and thus their sales and their bottom line (Spar, 1998).28
 High  standards  reduce  the  risk  of  catastrophic  events  such  as  environmental
disasters or strikes that would disrupt the production process or even undermine
the viability of the firm.
Ultimately, these effects may positively affect financial performance. While
individual  studies  provide  opposing  results,  a  recent  meta-analysis  suggests  that
corporate virtue in the form of social responsibility is on average likely to pay off
(Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003).
4.2. The Feasibility of Higher Standards
Hartman  et  al.  (2003)  provide  a  hands-on  approach  and  tell  the  story  of  positive
examples of MNEs who aimed to raise the standards in their global supply chain.
Their work illustrated that defining standards is the easy part of raising ‘corporate
social responsibility’.  The  main  challenges  concern  the  implementation  and
monitoring of these standards both within the firm and among its business partners.
Waddock and Bodwell (in Hartman et al. 2003) outline principles of management that
may help corporations develop an integrated approach to managing labour issues as
well as broader issues of corporate social responsibility. They outline three mutually
reinforcing processes that MNEs are suggests to set in motion “(1) inspiration or
vision setting and leadership commitment processes; (2) integration of the vision and
values  into  strategy,  human  resource,  and  operating  practices;  and  (3) innovation
processes,  which  involve  establishing  indicators  that  measure  responsibility
performance and provide a basis for improvements, remediation where necessary, and
learning”  (p.  119,  emphases  in  the  original).    Their  case  evidence  suggests  that
creating  a  code  of  conduct  is  insufficient  and  the  main  challenge  is  “accepting29
responsibility down the chain and introducing all the management systems necessary
to make adherence to the code possible” (p. 134).
We have at this stage, however, little systematic and independent evidence on
how changed corporate responsibility practices affect workers in the ‘sweatshops’,
local communities, and host economies at large? Especially indirect effects are often
overlooked. For instance, changes in child labour regulation may increase the share of
children not working, but it may also increase the share working in services rather
then manufacturing where law enforcement is more difficult. Such data are difficult to
obtain, among other reasons because a lot of child labour takes place in the informal
sector.
4.3. More Moral Dilemmas
The  global  social  responsibility  debate  raises  further  complex  ethical  issues.  For
instance, labour standards in MNE and their suppliers have to be seen in a context
where working conditions are typically considerably worse in local firms then in those
firms working with or for MNEs. Many children are involved in selling goods on the
streets, or in running family businesses such as restaurants. The discussion should
thus take a broader perspective including multinational and local firms.
Moreover ethical standards are grounded in culture, and cultures vary. There
has been a convergence towards common standards (or “hyper norms”) as encoded in
international  conventions.  But  these  conventions  reflect,  among  other  views,  the
interests of labour unions in North America and Europe wishing to limit competition.
It cannot be taken for granted that these standards are also what local ethical standards
would demand. It is reasonable to argue that product sold in, for example, the USA
should be produced according to minimum standards reflecting a social consensus in30
the USA. However, how about products made for local markets, or for third countries
such as Japan or Taiwan where labour rights in other countries are much less of a
political issue?
This leads to a complex issue that muddles the debate further. Many shoes
made in Vietnam are actually produced in Taiwanese and Korean owned firms, that
act as subcontractors to well known international brands. Whose standards should
apply, the host country’s, the foreign investor’s, or the customer’s? Why should a
Taiwanese manager, who experienced sweatshops in his own country three decades
ago, take a more generous approach towards labour issues in mainland China?
In conclusion, ethical aspects of business have become a major concern to
multinational enterprises. Higher standards may increase the positive effects of MNEs
on  their  host  economies,  albeit  some  argue  that  too  fast  rises  of  standards  may
undermine countries’ competitiveness and thus inhibit economic growth. However,
defining and monitoring standards raises complex ethical and managerial challenges.
Round-up
As emerging economies integrate into the global economies, international trade and
investment will continue to accelerate. MNEs will continue to act as pivotal interface
between domestic and international markets, and their relative importance may even
increase further.
The extensive and variety interaction of MNEs with their host societies may
tempt policy makers to micro-manage inwards foreign investment and to target their
instruments at attracting very specific types of projects. Yet, the potential impact is
hard to evaluate ex ante (or even ex post) and it is not clear if policy instruments31
would  be  effective  in  attractive  specifically  the  investors  that  would  generate  the
desired impact.
In my view, the first priority should be on enhancing the general institutional
framework  such  as  to  enhance  the  efficiency  of  markets,  the  effectiveness  of  the
public sector administration and the availability of infrastructure. On that basis, then,
carefully  designed  but  flexible  schemes  of  promoting  new  industries  may  further
enhance the chances of developing internationally competitive business clusters.32
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